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Introduction
In February 1996, a group of four Central and South American banana exporting
countries, together with the United States, requested consultations with the European
Community (EC) over a 1993 EC regulation for the importation, sale and distribution of
bananas. [FN1] The complainants estimated they were losing $147 million annually
because of the regulation, which gives preferential access in the EC market to bananas
*616 grown in Lomé Convention countries. [FN2] The parties were unable reach an
agreement, and three months later the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Dispute
Settlement Body formed a panel to resolve the complaint. [FN3]
Thereafter, a number of African, Caribbean and Pacific banana-producing countries
(ACP countries) that benefit from the EC regulation were allowed to participate in a
session of the panel proceedings under the newly created status of "observer." The panel
justified its decision to permit so many observers on the basis of the "very large" effect
the EC banana regime has on their economies. [FN4] To allay fears that widespread
intervention would complicate the proceedings, the panel took care to limit the observers'
participation. They were only allowed to make brief oral arguments and were not
expected to provide written submissions beyond answers to questions posed by the panel.
[FN5] The panel sessions occurred as scheduled, although the panel chairman has since

indicated that the panel's report will be delayed due, in part, to the large number of
countries involved in the case. [FN6] Delay was a reason why at least one party, the
United States, had initially objected to the observers' participation. [FN7]
GATT decisionmaking has long had a multipartite aspect, but rarely have so many
countries actively intervened in one case. It now appears that Bananas III will be seen as
a model of how WTO adjudication intends to treat the difficult issue of multilateral
dispute settlement, in addition to resolving complex points of law and fact. The case
merits *617 attention because its issues and arguments reflect the exceptionally wide
range of trade-related interests covered by GATT 1994. [FN8] These interests--and the
countries raising them--compete with each other for priority. In a very real sense, how
well these interests are reconciled in Bananas III will be a measure of the new GATT's
success.
This article's examination of the status of third parties under GATT is important for
several reasons, one of which is the proliferation of third party participation as
demonstrated by Bananas III. A second reason for its importance is that there has been
little written about third parties under GATT. [FN9] This neglect stands in sharp contrast
to ample literature on the related subject of greater public participation in the WTO.
[FN10] The oversight could be a function of GATT dispute resolution, which did not
always enjoy the level of public attention it garners today. Until recently the GATT
system handled no more than about a dozen disputes a year. [FN11] Many countries were
often content to ignore GATT dispute resolution, either because the system itself was
poorly understood or because GATT was *618 perceived as irrelevant to national
development. That attitude has now changed. The WTO faces increased litigation as
countries request panels and seek to intervene in large numbers, [FN12] and a review of
third party practice is therefore appropriate to better understand this form of participation.
A study of third parties under GATT should also help to better comprehend standing
under GATT generally. The issue of standing was squarely raised in Bananas III. [FN13]
The panel report will yield important clues as to how standing is to be dealt with in future
WTO dispute resolution.
The thesis of this paper is that, while it may be useful to guard against abuse of third
party status, what is happening now should be happening. The willingness of the Bananas
III panel to deal with a spectrum of representative interests is fully consistent with
GATT's history and mandate. This thesis is supported by an examination of GATT
instruments and panel reports involving third parties. Both reveal that third party
participation in GATT proceedings was designed to be, and has been, profound, vigorous
and sustained. They repudiate the notion that GATT dispute resolution is ill-equipped to
accommodate active intervention. GATT panels are not courts. Although panels and
courts exhibit some features in common, it is important to avoid comparing GATT
adjudication with municipal courts, where intervention is often restricted in deference to
the two-party paradigm, because GATT adjudication has been entrusted with reconciling
a range of interdependent concerns and must remain faithful to this purpose.
Part I of this article examines the traditional position of third parties in international law
and their status as originally conceived in GATT. The General Agreement established a
system of consensual adjudication and a hierarchy of interests in which third parties
required a "substantial interest" to intervene in dispute resolution. The definition of
"substantial interest" was qualified in some provisions, but never qualified for the

purpose of the General Agreement as a whole and only rarely specified in practice. This
ambiguity, together with the flexibility of GATT procedure, *619 meant that the term
"substantial interest" served as no standard at all. Instead, panels developed restrictions
on intervention that were more substantive than procedural, such as the rule precluding
the raising of new issues by third parties. The panel reports also identify group
representation as a feature of third party practice under GATT, which could allow
restricted intervention in the form of consolidated representation.
Part II of this article focuses on changes to third party status brought about by the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The WTO Agreement elaborates upon
third party procedure but does not change its liberal character. Rather than criticize the
continuing lack of precision, this article argues that the operative sections of the new
Agreement, in particular the Dispute Settlement Understanding, (DSU) must be
interpreted to be consistent with past practice in order to reconcile the ever widening
concerns of the WTO's mandate. This interpretive method is particularly important as
WTO dispute resolution becomes ever more multilateral.
Because there is always potential for overuse or abuse of third party status under GATT,
however, Part III recognizes a need to limit intervention where necessary and surveys the
law of intervention in two other adjudicative bodies, the International and European
Courts of Justice. Each has developed an effective method of restricting intervener
participation by relying, to some degree, on the tribunal's purpose, and these methods
suggest limitations for the WTO system. Part IV concludes that while multiple third
parties may tax WTO dispute resolution, precedent demonstrates that they do so
minimally and that active intervention is therefore not a threat to the integrity of the
system, but rather is a means of informed decisionmaking. [FN14]
*620 I. Third Parties in International Trade Law
A. Third Parties in International Law
A third party is defined in international law as a "state not party to a treaty." [FN15] The
traditional pacta tertiis rule [FN16] holds that treaties only bind consenting States,
leaving a non-party unaffected. This rule, reflecting international law's emphasis on
consent and bilateralism, for the most part, continues to apply today. [FN17]
Within multilateral treaties, however, the concept of a third party is somewhat different.
On accession to a treaty, a signatory consents to be bound by the treaty regime, but also
receives certain benefits in exchange. One such benefit is a heightened interest in the
process of resolving differences under the treaty. [FN18] A dispute over the scope of
treaty requirements between two signatories can affect not only the disputants, but also
can impact other treaty signatories, either as a direct consequence of the dispute or
through the interpretation of a treaty right or obligation. Thus, treaty membership eases
the concern common to all adjudication that third party participation may be too
speculative.
The point made in the preceeding paragraph suggests that all multilateral treaties change
bilateral relationships. Another reason for this "multilateralizing influence," mentioned
by Chinkin is the steady expansion of international regulation into areas not previously
thought to be within the realm of international jurisdiction. [FN19] As multilateral
treaties proliferate, so too do their memberships. It seems more reasonable to take *621
account of all relevant concerns, be they within or outside a particular bilateral context, in

order to best achieve a treaty's purpose.
Nevertheless, there comes a point when intervention can tax the treaty system and
threaten its ability to make decisions. There may also be situations where intervention is
sought for frivolous or vexatious ends, or for other reasons completely divorced from the
dispute itself. Because of these possibilities, it is important to develop means to limit
intervention. A problem in international law is that these means of limitation are not
readily apparent. In part, this may be due to the continuing notion of sovereign equality.
Simply put, limiting participation is difficult when all participants are presumptively
equal. But it is also true that procedures for effective multilateral adjudication are not
well developed in international law because complex multipartite disputes have been rare
and because international decisionmaking has not had to face the pressure of inconsistent
obligations, judicial economy, and the promotion of the efficient administration of justice
present in municipal legal systems. [FN20]
Trying to limit third party intervention in the international trade context raises
particularly hard questions. Not only are the challenges of sovereign equality and
inexperience present, but because international trade is inherently about economic
interdependence, this factor raises an added concern. Any change in the terms of trade is
seen as affecting the entire global economy, not just the parties to a dispute. There is
great built-in pressure to permit intervention.
In attempting to develop some method of limitation under GATT, it is therefore
important to determine what is required to intervene. This exercise will identify current
limits to third party participation and suggest what the possibilities might be. The central
question is, what level of interest is necessary to intervene? This inquiry can be divided
into two categories: one category focuses on the type of interest, the other on the degree
of interest. Regarding the type of interest, is third party standing based on a domestic
interest alone? Can a "secondary" interest qualify, that is, can a party intervene because
its nationals provide secondary factors, such as shipping, insurance or banking, that might
be impaired by a change in the terms of trade of the product in issue? Can a WTO
Member assume the interest of another Member, or even a non-Member, in a sort of
representative or "derivative" capacity? Can the WTO itself intervene? Is a third party
bound to support the arguments of one side, or can it act in the manner of amicus curiae,
advocating different arguments to arrive at one party's conclusion, or even at a different
conclusion? Can the *622 interest asserted be that of an exporter or an importer?
Regarding the degree of interest, is a direct legal interest always necessary, or is an
abstract one in the progressive interpretation of GATT sufficient? Can a Member's failure
to participate in a panel hearing be used against it, either in the case at hand or in another
case involving a similar issue? To try to answer these questions, it is useful to examine
the history of GATT.
B. Third Parties under GATT
GATT is an international treaty aimed at limiting tariffs, controlling the use of non-tariff
barriers, and eliminating discriminatory treatment in international commerce. GATT's
main substantive feature is the Most Favored Nation Clause (MFN Clause), which
requires a series of negotiated tariff reductions between GATT member countries. [FN21]
Pursuant to the MFN clause, the benefits of tariff reduction extended by one GATT
signatory to another are generally extended to all signatories. The converse of the MFN
arrangement is that if obligations are suspended between two signatories, then in theory

they should be suspended to all signatories as well. [FN22] This possibility recalls the
earlier discussion about third party standing under multilateral treaties and demonstrates
how MFN treatment can potentially intensify the "downside" of treaty obligations
because all signatories face potential injury when a country is retaliated against. This
injury may include loss of market share in the retaliating country or the disruption of
trade flows to other countries when the country retaliated against redirects its trade.
An adverse impact on global commerce is not the only consequence of the failure of
MFN. If the disputing countries decide to take the matter before a GATT panel, all
Members run the risk of a textual interpretation unfavorable to at least some national
interests. Domestic political pressure to "do something" may also build, particularly if
GATT is perceived as the source of domestic problems.
A second feature of GATT is its dispute settlement system, which has evolved over time
from a multilateral process involving many parties to a more bilateral process generally
involving fewer ones. Modern GATT *623 dispute settlement is characterized by a
highly adversarial bilateralism reminiscent of litigation in a municipal court, but retains
significant multilateral features. This curious dualism favors small countries and it is
therefore attractive for all countries to intervene for many reasons, including the genuine
fear that a panel report may affect them. [FN23]
It is not clear if the pro-intervention bias of MFN or the GATT dispute settlement system
was perceived in the first attempt to create an international trade law regime following
World War II. The Havana Charter of 1948 [FN24] envisaged liberal participation by
non-governmental organizations in activities of the projected International Trade
Organization. [FN25] There was, however, no equivalent vision or formal mechanism for
third party status in this arrangement. Chapter VIII of the Havana Charter, entitled
"Settlement of Differences," provided that a member country could make a written
representation "to such other Member or Members as it considers to be concerned" in
commencing a formal trade dispute. [FN26] This language placed the burden on the
complainant to identify which parties were respondents or affected by the measure in
dispute. After consultations failed, the concerned Members could submit the matter to
arbitration, the result of which was binding only on participants in the dispute.
The Charter also allowed a dispute to be referred to an eighteen-member executive board.
[FN27] The board was authorized to resolve the matter by various means, including
releasing "the Member or Members affected from obligations or the grant of
concessions." [FN28] Similar language was used to provide for further review by the
conference, the ITO's plenary body. [FN29] Article 96 of the Charter permitted any
Member whose interests were *624 prejudiced by a Conference decision to seek an
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. The request for an opinion was
to be accompanied by a question furnished "after consultation with the Members
substantially interested." [FN30]
The striking ambiguity of the Havana Charter made it of little assistance in defining the
conditions under which Members could be third parties. In this respect the lack of an
explicit intervention provision was a key oversight. In addition, the complainant's burden
of determining interested third parties presumed that the complainant would have all the
relevant information to make this determination. Even in ideal circumstances this is a
questionable assumption. The Charter's language also permitted appeal to the ICJ--a poor
choice given the expertise and efficiency of the Court. In sum, third party status seems

not to have been carefully conceived by the drafters of the Havana Charter. One possible
explanation for the Charter's textual vagueness could be the consensual nature of the
postwar trade structure regime. On such a theory, there was no need for well-defined
third party status because Members could have reasonably assumed that they would be
consulted in decisions affecting their interests.
The ambiguity and failure of the Havana Charter are to be contrasted with the clarity and
success of the General Agreement, concluded in October 1947. [FN31] Due to the
Members' deliberate preference for informality, the General Agreement did not spell out
any formal system of conflict resolution. Over time, however, a system of "working
parties" came into being to examine particular disputes over the interpretation of GATT.
Third parties were a prominent feature of this model as the typical working party
included representatives of the principals, one or two countries supporting either side, and
some neutrals. Although the neutrals gave advice and their concurrence in the final
decision was important, the true aim of a working party was agreement among the
principals. Nevertheless, third parties played an important role in helping to generate a
consensus that became the basis for many decisions. [FN32]
*625 In October 1952, the working party model was tentatively superseded by a panel
system, which was seen as more objective and as "satisfying the legal instincts of the
GATT administrators." [FN33] GATT dispute resolution became more judicialized.
Parties were afforded an opportunity to present their case before a panel, which would
also hear from any other interested party. The panel would then draft a report, submit an
interim version for the parties' consideration, and eventually make recommendations to
the collective GATT membership, which had the final authority over disposition of the
case. [FN34]
In the evolution from working parties to panels, the role of third parties changed. Third
parties went from being presumptive equals offering suggestions for the collective good
to being parties with their own separate status and distinct interests at stake. A small, but
telling, sign of this change was a decision by the GATT Council in 1958 to regulate
procedures under which a complainant was required to inform the GATT DirectorGeneral about consultations under Article XXII. The decision directed that notice of
consultations be given to all Members in case they wanted to join. [FN35] Notice would
not have been necessary had non-parties, including interveners, still been considered
inherent participants in the dispute resolution process.
The text of the General Agreement may have contributed to the process of
individualization of non-parties by identifying specific interests that parties could assert.
A hierarchy was established, beginning with a "principal supplying interest," followed by
a "substantial interest," and ending with what might be called simply an "interest." GATT
Article XXVIII made clear that a "principal supplying interest" is to be distinguished
from a "substantial interest." In referring to parties with a "principal supplying interest,"
Article XXVIII:1 spoke of "negotiations and agreement" with a Contracting Party
wanting to modify or withdraw a tariff concession. In referring to parties with a
"substantial interest," the same clause spoke only of a duty to consult. Article 4 of the
Interpretive Note to Article XXVIII indicated that it would not normally be appropriate
for the Contracting Parties to determine that more than one Contracting Party had a
"principal supplying interest." The implication of these provisions is evident. A "principal
supplying interest" was considered to have more at stake than a "substantial interest," and

while there might be only one "principal supplying interest" there could be many more
"substantial interests." From this distinction, it is possible to conclude that a "principal
supplying interest" would be entitled to invoke *626 GATT dispute resolution, whereas a
"substantial interest" would have a lesser right, conceivably the right to intervene.
The General Agreement also elaborated on the term "substantial interest," which was tied
to a specific trade interest [FN36] as it had often been under the Havana Charter. [FN37]
Yet, the repetition and varied usage occurring in the General Agreement made the term
clearer. The term's most comprehensive definition occurred in Section 7 of the
Interpretive Note to Article XXVIII. This reads:
the expression "substantial interest" is not capable of a precise definition and accordingly
may present difficulties for the CONTRACTING PARTIES. It is, however, intended to
be construed to cover only those contracting parties which have, or in the absence of
discriminatory quantitative restrictions affecting their exports could reasonably be
expected to have, a significant share in the market of the contracting party seeking to
modify or withdraw the concession.
The Note suggests that the drafters originally conceived "substantial interest" as being
trade-linked, but much of the term's definition remained unclear. For example, was a
"substantial interest" to be objectively or subjectively determined? Article XXVIII
explicitly states that "substantial interest" was to be "determined by the Contracting
Parties," but this is not true for other provisions mentioning a "substantial interest."
[FN38] Often there *627 was no mechanism for identifying a "substantial interest;" thus,
in reality, the burden was on each individual country to make its own determination and
then intervene. It is entirely possible to imagine that within the consensual atmosphere of
GATT countries might also have been reluctant to challenge assertions of such interest,
leading to the legitimation of self-assertion through practice.
The term "substantial interest" assumed formal importance in the 1979 Tokyo Round
Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance [FN39] and in associated agreements. [FN40] Pursuant to Article 15 of the
Understanding, each GATT Member with a substantial interest in a matter before a panel
could be heard after giving notice. [FN41] The conditional language used in the article (".
. . should have an opportunity to be heard . . .") suggested that the right to intervene was
not absolute, however. Third parties wanting to intervene in pre-hearing consultations
had no free-standing right to do so, entitlement to receive the litigants' submissions
before the hearing, and access to settlement information was restricted. [FN42]
An Agreed Description of Customary Practice regarding GATT dispute settlement was
annexed to the Understanding as a general statement of procedural norms. [FN43] The
Agreed Description struck a careful balance between the bilateral and multilateral aspects
of the adjudicative process by stating that "a solution mutually acceptable to the parties to
a dispute is clearly to be preferred," adding that "there is normally a presumption that a
breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other contracting parties." [FN44] It also
observed that previous panels had heard views of "any contracting party having a
substantial interest in the matter, which is not directly party to the dispute, but which has
expressed in the Council a desire to present its views." [FN45] The Agreed Description's
language indicated that, *628 despite the bilateralizing influence of formal procedures
embodied in the Tokyo Round Understanding, there remained a strong orientation toward
multipartite dispute settlement within GATT.

Having examined the controlling instruments, it is useful to remember that words only
communicate their true meaning in the context of their usage. A more complete picture of
third party practice and limits to intervention under GATT can be had by reviewing panel
reports and drawing conclusions from the assembled evidence. [FN46]
The first impression provided by a review of panel reports is the sheer number of
potential third parties that were habitually notified about panel proceedings. [FN47] This
fact demonstrates a willingness on the part of panels to permit active intervention. This
record indicates a strong tradition of intervention in GATT dispute resolution, at least
since the early 1980s, *629 and repudiates any claim that GATT adjudication was
somehow handicapped by third party participation.
However, panel reports do not always make clear which countries actually participated as
third parties. Although many countries were notified, some took part which were not
listed as notified [FN48] and others reserved their right to intervene without subsequently
appearing. Some countries, more ambiguously, simply "registered an interest." [FN49]
A number of reports mention third parties out of a persistent concern for fair procedure.
Panels demanded precision in the terms of reference circulated among members so that
third parties could make a considered decision about intervention. Thus, in Restrictions
on Imports of Sugar, [FN50] the complainant, Australia, claimed that the reallocation of a
portion of the U.S.'s sugar quota for Guyana to Belize, Jamaica and Trinidad was
inconsistent with the principle of non-discriminatory administration of quantitative
restrictions under Article XIII:2 of the General Agreement. The United States, as
respondent, argued that the issue was not covered by the panel's terms of reference
because the issue had arisen after the establishment of the panel by the GATT Council in
September 1988. The panel recognized that it had to interpret its terms of reference not
only in the light of the interests of the parties to the dispute, but also with regard to the
rights of third parties. It accepted the U.S. argument that because the matter had arisen
only after the establishment of the panel, Contracting Parties had no reason to expect that
the reallocation of U.S. sugar quotas among Caribbean countries would arise. The panel
therefore decided that the reallocation was not part of its mandate. Similar comments
appear in other panel reports. [FN51]
Another feature revealed by the panel reports is that the term "substantial interest" was
rarely taken literally. The record seldom discloses any careful scrutiny of the nature of
the substantial interest asserted, nor does it disclose whether such assertions were ever
successfully challenged. The relevant procedural rules do not make clear whether parties
seeking to intervene were required to state their interest for this *630 purpose. Thus, a
third party submission could detail the link between the third party and the respondent, as
in the following description of Hong Kong's position in a challenge brought by Canada
and the EC of a U.S. merchandise import fee:
Hong Kong stated that it had a particular interest in the matter because the United States
was the principal market for its exports and that as a result of the imposition of the
merchandise processing fee, the total cost of Hong Kong's exports to the United States
was estimated to increase by approximately U.S. $20 million in 1987. [FN52]
But more often, the panel treated the information of "substantial interest" provided by the
third party ambiguously. This treatment implies either that the information was not
supplied by the third party, or that the panel overlooked or ignored it. Thus, manifesting a
"substantial interest" was not considered a necessary condition. An example of such a

case--one of many [FN53]--is the following description of Brazil's position in a challenge
brought against U.S. duties imposed on certain types of steel from the EC:
Brazil argued that the DOC had identified subsidization and calculated subsidy margins
on the basis of methodological approaches that were unreasonable and devoid of
economic rationale. Brazil requested the Panel to find that the United States had rendered
final determinations that contravened the United States' basic obligations under the
Agreement and the General Agreement, in particular Articles 1 and 4 of the Agreement.
[FN54]
From the panel's description it is impossible to tell whether Brazil's interest was direct
because Brazilian steel competed directly with the European products targeted by U.S.
countervailing duties, whether the country had a more abstract interest in the case, or
whether the panel simply omitted to mention the link in its report. The insignificance of
the *631 term "substantial interest" was further highlighted by the fact that panels
accepted assertions of purely prospective interest as well. [FN55]
The meaning of "substantial interest" lost all qualification when in certain cases, such as
those reviewing subsidies, antidumping and countervailing findings by national
authorities, the interest asserted was in ensuring a fair process. [FN56] To this extent, the
"substantial interest" was one possessed by all GATT Members equally. The possibility
that a single GATT Member might be hurt more than any other was hypothetical; a
"substantial interest" thus had to be imputed to all Members in order to ensure
compliance with the treaty language. In these instances, a "substantial interest" meant
nothing and had no use as a term of limitation.
Panel reports also give a clearer idea of the scope of third party representation. GATT
rules did not indicate whether GATT Members could act as agents for other Members,
but practice suggests this is true. [FN57] Whether this practice could be carried one step
further to permit Members to advance an interest on behalf of all Members is not known,
although there appears to be no reason why, given consent, this could not occur. [FN58]
At the same time there is curious contrast in the fact that representation of the *632
Contracting Parties as a collective entity would have been impermissible in light of the
presumable restriction of intervention to "[individual] contracting parties" in Article 15 of
the Tokyo Round Understanding. The same language would also appear to rule out third
party participation by the GATT Secretariat or non-GATT Members.
While intervention on the side of the complainant was contemplated, there was no
procedure for a Member to intervene as co-respondent. It is not immediately evident why
this should cause a problem since the term "third party" was not qualified in GATT
instruments. Nevertheless, successive panels interpreted "third party" to mean
intervention on the side of the complainant alone. On at least one occasion, however, the
GATT Council decided a country could assume a position analogous to that of corespondent. [FN59]
Despite the flexibility and even ambiguity, third party participation was not entirely
without limits. Panels established a practice of disregarding issues or defenses forwarded
solely by third parties. In Customs User Fee, [FN60] for example, India intervened and
requested that the panel consider whether a U.S. duty exemption for goods from least
developed countries was consistent with MFN obligations. Two other interveners,
Australia and Singapore, also referred to this issue and to the related issue of a duty
exemption granted to certain countries under the U.S. Caribbean Basin Economic

Recovery Act. The two complainants, Canada and the EC, did not raise either matter but
declared that they had no objection to the panel pronouncing upon them. The panel
observed that neither exemption was GATT-consistent and concluded that "no answer in
opposition to [India, Australia and Singapore's] legal claims was given, nor was the Panel
aware of any that could be given." [FN61] Nevertheless, the panel concluded, it would
not be appropriate to make a formal finding *633 because "GATT practice has been for
panels to make findings only on those issues raised by the parties to the dispute."
Although no authority was cited for this statement, it has been followed by subsequent
panels. [FN62]
The "new issue" rule was interpreted strictly in other contexts as well. For example,
panels declined to consider apparently relevant arguments when the parties that could
have invoked them chose not to. [FN63] Even where a respondent admitted "it would not
disagree" with an argument posited in third party submissions, the argument was
disregarded. [FN64]
Panels also did not hesitate to invoke the bilateral nature of a dispute as a limit to their
remedial jurisdiction. One of the most noted cases of this type was U.S.--Trade Measures
Affecting Nicaragua. [FN65] The case arose from the U.S. embargo in May 1985 on
trade and transportation links with Nicaragua. Nicaragua's exports to the U.S., valued at
$162 million in 1980, had fallen to $20 million in 1985 due to various U.S. measures
against the Sandinista regime. Nicaragua's trade with its neighboring states in the Central
American Common Market was also severely disrupted. Nicaragua argued before the
panel that a recommendation to permit it to withdraw its trade concessions with respect to
the U.S. "would be a meaningless step" because the U.S. embargo had already effectively
done so. As an alternative, Nicaragua sought a general waiver for other GATT Members
to allow them to extend more favorable treatment to Nicaraguan products,
notwithstanding these Members' MFN obligations, thus, restoring the competitive
relationship that existed for Nicaragua when it joined GATT.
The panel observed that the conditions for granting waivers were restrictive. Because the
panel felt it would be acting contrary to GATT practice in recommending a change to
third party obligations and because, *634 in any event, no third party could be consulted
since none had participated in the hearing, it declined to make such a recommendation
"on purely procedural grounds." Bilateralism was also the theory underlying a panel
decision not to allow a third party to compel continuing argument in the face of the
parties' desire to compromise. [FN66]
Despite strictness in some circumstances, it is conceivable that countries could intervene
in order to make submissions for collateral purposes; that is, for purposes going beyond
the precise confines of the case. There was always the possibility of making arguments
for a prospective purpose, comparable to the process of "reading in" during the passage of
bills in the U.S. Congress. This practice was hinted at in Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
where Australia submitted that:
the present dispute concerned solely the selective import prohibitions by the United
States on yellowfin tuna according to the country of origin of the product. The dispute did
not concern prohibitions related to the fishing practices of certain countries, since the
prohibition could apply to those countries even if they met or exceeded the standard for
fishing practices for the product of United States origin. Nor did the dispute concern trade
in marine mammals, or trade restrictions taken in accordance with any other international

treaty or arrangement. The United States had confirmed in its submission that it was not
obligated by any other treaty to maintain the trade restrictions against EEC Member
States. The Panel's findings would therefore have no implications for the GATT
consistency of measures taken under any other existing or future treaty directed to
conservation of the environment. . . . The United States measures in force did not require
the protection of all dolphin life or health in the eastern tropical Pacific, but were linked
to feasible incidental mortality rates associated with particular fishing methods. [FN67]
Australia's carefully crafted submission, as phrased by the panel, appears concerned with
defining what the U.S. measures were not, possibly to preclude future GATT challenges
to its own legislation or treaties.
An examination of panel reports therefore concludes that while a bilateral model formed
the core of GATT dispute resolution and implied a limited role for interveners, GATT's
essential multilateralism favored a liberal attitude to third parties in practice. The limits to
intervention that developed under GATT were more substantive than procedural. A*635
"substantial interest" was ambiguous and frequently not a standard at all, but a third
party's attempt to raise new issues was impermissible. There were, of course, advantages
and disadvantages to this posture. Inasmuch as GATT dispute resolution had a strong
consensual and collective focus, active intervention permitted a comprehensive
appreciation and resolution of cases. But participation of this kind also created potential
for overuse, or worse, abuse. More detrimental still, perhaps, was the opportunity for bias
towards the perspective and interpretations of Members active in asserting their third
party rights, since these were mostly wealthy developed countries. [FN68] In light of this
historical perspective, current third party law and practice under the WTO are now
examined.
II. Third Parties after the Uruguay Round
Details of the negotiations and structure of the WTO and GATT 1994 which emerged
from the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations are available elsewhere. It is
sufficient here to note that as a result of the Uruguay Round the coverage of GATT was
expanded and formalized and the WTO was created to replace what were essentially
interim institutional measures dating from the late 1940s. The operative aspect of the
WTO was divided into four councils and a separate Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
designed to administer a set of reformulated dispute settlement rules known as the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). [FN69] A new "reverse consensus" rule came
into being for the adoption of panel reports by the Council, meaning that reports are
adopted unless there is a consensus against them. This reversed the previous rule, which
had allowed single countries to veto panel reports and caused some contentious reports to
remain unadopted.
*636 The near identity of the third party provision in the Dunkel Draft of 1991 [FN70]
with that of the DSU suggests third party participation was not a controversial issue
during the final phase of the Uruguay Round. What is different between the pre- and
post-Uruguay Round GATT is the range of subjects covered by the new GATT,
particularly services and intellectual property. These extend coverage of the agreement to
topics that are inherently harder to quantify and therefore it is more difficult to identify a
peculiar "substantial interest." To this extent, standards for third party participation may
become even more flexible and indeterminate under the GATT 1994 than they have been
in the past. [FN71]

A. The Dispute Settlement Understanding
The DSU continues the aim of settling bilateral disputes within a strong multilateral
framework. Article 3(4), for example, attempts to recognize a wider duty to provide
appropriate outcomes for the parties and other interests by indicating that
recommendations and rulings are aimed at achieving "a satisfactory settlement of the
matter." [FN72] It is rational to assume that silence as to exactly whom the settlement is
to satisfy implies that panels should, to some extent, take into account the interests of all
parties to the GATT. This observation is supported by the language of Article 3(5)
requiring that solutions to matters formally brought up under the DSU "shall not nullify
or impair benefits accruing to any Member under th[e contested] agreements." [FN73]
Article 3(2) also states that the "recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to
or diminish the *637 rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements,"
including, presumably, the rights and obligations of third parties. [FN74]
Article 10, entitled "Third Parties," is the principal section according Member States the
right to intervene. It emphasizes GATT's multilateral focus by explicitly providing that
both the interests of parties "and those of other Members . . . shall be fully taken into
account during the panel process." [FN75] This section does not indicate exactly how
these non-party interests are to be taken into account, particularly when no party
intervenes, but Article 10(2) identifies any Member possessing "a substantial interest" as
having the express right to make written submissions and to be heard by a panel.
Although the all-important term "substantial interest" is found at least a dozen times in
the GATT 1994 and its accompanying agreements and is often trade-qualified, [FN76] in
Article 10 the term is not qualified at all. The implication is that "substantial interest" has
been given a new, wider definition in DSU Article 10 than in previous GATT usage.
Where it is trade-related, the interest asserted must necessarily be so. [FN77] However,
where it is not so qualified the "substantial interest" can be different. This flexible
application accords with the breadth of subject matter now covered by DSU procedures.
From the point of view of potential third parties, the DSU incorporates a number of
features improving earlier arrangements. Although Article 10's language does not give
third parties a general right to attend hearings, this deficiency is mitigated by the
requirement that third party arguments be "fully taken into account" and that third party
submissions be "reflected in the panel report." Article 10(4) permits a third party which
considers that a matter already the subject of a panel proceeding "nullifies or impairs
benefits" to itself to have recourse to the dispute resolution mechanism. If a panel is
requested, the Article mandates the matter's referral to the panel hearing the original case,
most likely to avoid inconsistent decisions.
*638 Two improvements outside Article 10 directly benefit third parties. Article 3(6)
provides that when settlements to matters formally raised under the DSU are reached,
these must be notified to the DSB where "any Member may raise any point relating
thereto." [FN78] Article 4(11) allows a member believing it has a substantial trade
interest to join consultations unless the respondent country objects. [FN79]
The requirements for third party status remain minimal. Interveners must have a
substantial interest and notify the DSB in writing. A third condition, that the matter is
before a panel, is suggested by the phrase in Article 10(2) that "[a]ny Member having a
substantial interest in a matter before a panel." [FN80] Additional support for this view is
the fact that the term "third party" is first used in Article 10 and not in pre-panel

proceedings such as consultation, good offices, conciliation or mediation. However, the
interpretation is contradicted by Article 6 of the DSU Appendix 3 Working Procedures,
which requires that "[a]ll third parties which have notified their interest in the dispute to
the DSB shall be invited in writing to present their views during a session of the first
substantive meeting of the panel." [FN81] The implication seems to be that, presuming
they have the requisite interest, Members attain third party status upon notification to the
DSB and then present their views at some subsequent time when a panel is seized of the
matter. The phrasing leaves open the possibility of pre-panel third party participation.
Chinkin refers to "unequal intervention" where intervention takes place after the original
parties have committed themselves to their arguments. [FN82] She suggests that parties
should not be disadvantaged by such tactics. In the context of GATT, there is no rule on
point, but analogous practice with respect to parties is to disregard latecomers unless
there is *639 consent. [FN83] However, one can argue that the dispute resolution system
already contemplates a form of unequal intervention by permitting consideration of panel
reports by the relevant council.
B. Third Parties as "Third Participants": WTO Appellate Review
A new feature of the WTO dispute settlement machinery is appellate review, provided by
DSU Article 17 and elaborated upon in the Working Procedures on Appellate Review.
[FN84] Formal identification as a third party under DSU Article 10 is essential because
the Appellate Working Procedures limit third party participation on appeal to those
parties having already "notified the DSB of a substantial interest" at the panel stage.
[FN85] On appeal a third party is termed a "third participant." It is permitted to make
written submissions and to be heard by a panel of the Appellate Body, known as a
"division."
The Appellate Working Procedures contain a number of important features that help
further define the concept of third party under the WTO Agreement. Third participant
status is accorded on notification to the Appellate Body alone. There is no provision for
reassessment by the Appellate Body of the "substantial interest" asserted before the panel.
Furthermore, the Appellate Working Procedures make clear a Member may not intervene
for the first time in a case at the appellate stage. Appearance by third participants is
optional [FN86] and the rules contemplate paper submissions. [FN87] However, a nonappearing third participant must remain ready in case it is requested to answer questions
by the division and is thus obligated to respond. [FN88]
*640 There are some subtle distinctions between third party practice before panels and
divisions of the Appellate Body. Under DSU Article 10(3), a third party can make written
submissions but is only allowed to receive the parties' submissions at the first meeting of
the panel, which can constrain the ability of third parties to effectively respond to issues.
However, under Article 24 of the Appellate Working Procedures, third participants are
given twenty-five days following the filing of the Notice of Appeal to make written
submissions. Because this is fifteen days longer than the appellants have to make
submissions, there is an interim for a third participant to carefully consider and respond
to the appellant's position. This advantage disappears if the third participant intervenes on
the respondent's behalf because the respondent also has twenty-five days to make
submissions. [FN89]
The Appellate Working Procedures do not indicate the process to be followed if a party
has intervened in a non-party capacity before the panel, as the United States did in Japan-

-Trade in Semi-conductors, [FN90] and then seeks to participate on appeal. Article 16(1)
of the Appellate Working Procedures allows a division to modify its process where a
"procedural question arises that is not covered by the rules." [FN91] Presumably,
whatever modified process was agreed upon would apply in such a case.
C. Further Issues
The DSU and Appellate Working Procedures leave a number of unresolved issues that
future panels, divisions, and perhaps ultimately the WTO itself, will have to address.
Foremost is the prospect that third parties remain procedurally disadvantaged in WTO
proceedings. Under the DSU, they are only permitted to attend a single session of a
hearing. [FN92] This limitation constrains their ability to follow the proceedings and
react to developments in camera. How strictly it will apply remains to be seen.
*641 The issue of an appropriate remedy for third parties under the DSU is also
unsatisfactory. Compensation is limited to "any party having invoked the dispute
settlement procedures." [FN93] Third parties do not invoke the dispute settlement
machinery and therefore are precluded from seeking compensatory awards. The DSU's
language thus restricts third parties to seeking declarative relief.
Finally, active third party intervention makes panel selection difficult. [FN94] DSU
Article 8(3) prohibits the selection of panel members who are citizens of countries
involved in a dispute, including third parties. As more third parties participate in cases,
therefore, the pool of potential panelists shrinks. Curiously, this same restriction does not
apply to division members. [FN95]
D. Third Party Practice under GATT and the WTO: The Bananas Trilogy
At present, third party and third participant practice under the WTO has not been
markedly different from what it was before the Uruguay Round. Only a few issues have
arisen under the new system and their treatment suggests a "business as usual" attitude
towards intervention. This is in keeping with the identity of the pre- and post-Uruguay
Round third party provisions and the WTO Agreement's Continuity Clause. [FN96]
For example, in its first decision the Appellate Body expressed the familiar concern that
respondents' conditional arguments were unfair, in part because these arguments were not
raised in the appellant's Notice of Appeal. [FN97] This aspect of the decision
demonstrates the Appellate Body's appropriate concern for third party rights, even in
absence of intervention. In another case before a panel, the United States acted
consistently with past practice in reserving its right to submit its views as a third party out
*642 of mere "concerns of principle," even though the U.S. was not then exporting the
product in contention. [FN98]
The consistent treatment of third parties under old and new GATT dispute settlement has
been underlined by a trilogy of cases concerning the regime for bananas in the European
Community. The most recent case in the series, Bananas III, was canvassed at the
beginning of this article. The trilogy itself is the product of a confluence of two changes
of law--one in the European Community, the other in GATT. Because of their timing, the
changes have generated three decisions: the first, reviewing the old European regulations
for consistency with GATT 1947, the second, reviewing the new European regulations
for consistency with GATT 1947, and the third, reviewing the new European regulations
for consistency with GATT 1994. To better understand the issues of standing that the
trilogy raises, it is necessary to review some background.

Since 1988, banana consumption in the EC has accounted for 40% of the world's total,
the largest single share. Until 1993, there was no common EC tariff structure for bananas-a legacy of history, different foreign aid policies, and disparate national consumption
patterns. Five EC members--France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom-permitted duty-free entry for bananas grown in the EC and in their former colonies
located in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Six other EC members--the Benelux
countries, Denmark, Greece and Ireland--also permitted duty-free entry for bananas from
ACP countries, but imposed a 20% ad valorem duty on imports from elsewhere.
Germany alone permitted duty-free imports irrespective of source. [FN99] Most of its
bananas originated in Latin America.
In February 1993, five Central and South American banana exporting countries [FN100]
requested the establishment of a GATT panel under the Tokyo Round Understanding to
examine all national banana regulations in the EC, with the exception of Germany's, as
potentially discriminatory under GATT. A panel was established to hear the case,
referred to as Bananas I. Seven other countries reserved their rights to make submissions,
but only *643 Brazil, Mexico and the Philippines took the opportunity to do so. In
addition, the delegations of Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Jamaica, Madagascar and Senegal-all ACP countries--expressed an interest in participating and a special procedure was
agreed to for this purpose. [FN101] The panel did not elaborate as to why ACP
participation required a special procedure, although presumably this was because the
ACP members wanted to intervene on behalf of the respondent EC. It is also unclear
whose interests the ACP members purported to represent: those of all seventy Lomé
Convention countries, a subgroup thereof, or simply their own national interests. [FN102]
This is an important question because not all Lomé Convention countries are GATT
Members. If the five-member group made submissions on behalf of the entire Convention
membership, then this resulted in indirect standing in GATT for non-GATT Members.
[FN103] The panel ultimately concluded that the national banana regulations, specifically
tariffs and quantitative restrictions, were inconsistent with GATT. In June 1993, it
recommended that these be made to conform.
While Bananas I was being considered, Council Regulation 404/93, establishing a tariff
rate quota for bananas entering the European Community, became effective in July 1993.
The motive behind the new regulation was the drive for a single internal market by 1992.
[FN104] The regulation *644 permitted up to 2 million tonnes of bananas to enter the
market, with 857,700 tonnes being reserved for bananas from traditional ACP sources.
These ACP bananas continued to enter duty-free, but those over quota were assessed a
duty of 750 ecu per tonne. The balance of the quota, approximately 1.2 million tonnes,
was reserved for third country bananas and non-traditional ACP bananas. Third country
bananas under quota were assessed a duty of 100 ecu per tonne; over quota, the duty rose
to 850 ecu per tonne. The regulation also instituted a contentious system of import
licences. These were allocated to traders according to their traditional source of supply,
with 66.5% being reserved for third country banana importers, 30% for traditional ACP
banana importers, and the balance of 3.5% for non-traditional ACP banana imports. The
new scheme was roundly criticized by Latin American banana producers as depriving
them of market share.
In June 1993, as Regulation 404/93 was about to go into effect, the same five Central and
South American banana exporting countries that had launched Bananas I requested the

establishment of a GATT panel regarding Regulation 404/93. A panel was created under
the Tokyo Round Understanding to hear the case, referred to as Bananas II. [FN105] At
least a dozen countries, [FN106] including many of the ACP producers who had taken
part in Bananas I, expressed an interest in participating in the panel's work and were
allowed to do so. The panel report does not disclose whether any special procedure was
agreed to. The panel simply indicated that "in the interest of transparency among
contracting parties having a substantial interest in the trade of bananas, it would be
reasonable to invite such countries to meetings of the Panel." [FN107] The report also
does not reveal in what capacity the ACP producers participated. The report indicates that
several ACP countries made lengthy submissions claiming that elimination of their Lomé
Convention banana preference would put into question "the survival of much or most of
their economy." [FN108] Other producers, such as Brazil and Tanzania, contested the
indirect [FN109] or *645 prospective [FN110] effect of the regulation. The panel
considered these submissions, but in finding against the validity of Regulation 404/93
stressed that "it had to take into account that its terms of reference were to examine the
EEC measures at issue exclusively in terms of their legal consistency with the General
Agreement" and not broader measures of concern. [FN111] It went on to observe that the
Contracting Parties had at their disposal the possibility of approving the regulation under
GATT Articles XXIV:10 or XXV:5. In doing so "economic and social considerations"
could be taken into account. The panel concluded that "nothing in its report would
prevent the parties to the Lomé Convention from achieving their treaty objectives,
including the objective of promoting the production and commercialization of bananas
from ACP countries through the use of policy instruments consistent with the General
Agreement." [FN112]
Since Bananas II, the EC has effectively blocked adoption of both the first and second
panel reports, sought and received a waiver from GATT for its Lomé Convention
obligations, [FN113] and concluded a compromise Framework Agreement with some of
the Bananas II litigants. [FN114] There remains, however, serious discontent with the
Community banana regime, *646 stoked, in part, by the deft diplomacy of the United
States. [FN115] In May 1993, several dissatisfied countries began Bananas III under the
DSU, as outlined above. This last challenge involves granting observer status to an
undisclosed number of ACP countries, as well as traditional third party status to Canada
and Japan. [FN116]
Once again, it is not clear on whose behalf the ACP countries appear. They sought
"enhanced third party status" but had to settle for standing as "observers." The distinction
between the two forms of representation is not evident, nor is it apparent how "enhanced
third party status" differs from ordinary "third party status." Again, the difference may be
related to the side on which a country seeks to intervene. An alternative explanation is
that "enhanced third party status" is a term coined in the trade press.
In its interim decision on the issue of ACP standing, the Bananas III panel indicated that
two factors motivated its grant of observer status: the important economic interests at
stake for the countries concerned and their third party status in Bananas I and II. As
criteria of limitation, economic impact and precedent approximate "substantial interest."
Both are substantial to the countries concerned. At the same time, they differ from
"substantial interest." This is acceptable if one remembers that the Bananas Trilogy does
not involve a classic third party intervention under GATT, that is, it involves intervention

on behalf of the complainant. Instead, the Bananas Trilogy raises the issue of intervention
on behalf of the respondent, which is virtually indistinguishable from more conventional
third party practice.
At the same time the decision on standing is noteworthy because it went beyond the
"letter" of DSU rules in creating a new status whose closest precedent was the ad hoc
creation of the GATT Council in Trade in Semi-conductors. [FN117] The term
"observer" cannot be found in the DSU. Rather, it is a creation of the panel's inherent
power to develop its own process, as set out in DSU Article 1(2).
The panel's decision is problematic from the point of view of consistency, however,
because it immediately raises the question of when "observer" status is to be accorded. It
also leaves the ACP members in limbo with respect to any appeal of Bananas III, which
many consider likely to occur given the history of contention. This is because observers
do not, strictly speaking, fall within the definition of "third party" for the purposes of the
Appellate Working Procedures, and, as noted above, *647 meeting this definition is
essential for the preservation of any right to participate in the appeal. It remains to be
seen whether the Appellate Body will interpret Article 16(1) of the Appellate Working
Procedures liberally to make room for observer participation on appeal.
The Bananas Trilogy reflects a trend in which a range of interests is being dealt with
under GATT in order to achieve a comprehensive resolution of a dispute. In part, this is a
sign of GATT's success to date. Liberalized trading norms have fostered global economic
interdependence which have, in turn, meant progressively closer ties that can be easily
upset. Several cases involving multiple parties are currently either before panels or
divisions, or have already been decided. [FN118] Third party standing is only one aspect
of their multilateralization.
The question posed at the beginning of this article was how limits on participation are to
be imposed in such an interdependent environment. GATT has avoided formal
restriction, as embodied in the term "substantial interest," in favor of practice derived
restrictions on the raising of new issues. A review of the caselaw also reveals that both
group representation and paper submissions are acceptable, meaning that these might be
encouraged, or even mandated, among third parties without significant departure from
current WTO law or practice. In order to formulate additional ways of limiting
intervention in the context of the WTO, it is worthwhile to examine how other
international adjudicators have restrained third party intervention.
III. Intervention in International Adjudication
A. The International and European Courts of Justice
The original predecessor to the ICJ was established in 1899 and its procedure was heavily
influenced by arbitral law. [FN119] The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is a younger
creation, having been founded in 1950. Its jurisdiction and mandate approximate more
directly the working of a municipal court. The differences between the two models do not
obscure *648 the fact that they share a number of similarities with respect to third party
law and practice.
Third party intervention before the ICJ occurs pursuant to Articles 62 and 63 of the
Court's Statute. [FN120] Each article applies in a distinct situation. Article 62 permits a
State which considers that it has "an interest of a legal nature which may be affected" by
a case before the ICJ to request intervention, which the Court must allow or deny. Article

63, in contrast, declares in broad language that countries party to a convention, the
construction of which is at issue before the Court, have a "right to intervene." The logic
behind the statutory distinction is evident; an interest in intervention is presumed in the
treaty context by membership.
The function of Article 62 seems to require a stricter standard than Article 63, but in fact
both have been interpreted narrowly by the Court. There have been only seven
applications for intervention in the history of the ICJ and its predecessors and only two
have been successful. [FN121] This record has led at least one commentator to observe
that intervention before the ICJ "seems at present no more than a remote possibility."
[FN122]
Most relevant for present purposes is Article 63, which has been formally at issue before
the Court only three times. In two older cases, Article 63 was interpreted liberally to
allow third party participation. Today, however, both of these decisions are of some
vintage and do not reflect the recent restrictive tone of the Court. Hardly surprising in
light of third party practice under GATT is the ICJ's concern with countries
demonstrating adequate "interest." More recently, it has gone beyond mere *649 interest,
as reflected by treaty membership, to find that the purpose of the intervention was not
genuine and to deny the declaration. [FN123]
The ICJ has also held that mere preoccupation with principles of law, as reflected in a
declaration under Article 63, is insufficient to sustain an intervener's interest. [FN124]
There is thus no concept of intervention for what could be termed "public rights" or
obligations erga omnes. This posture has been criticized as a severely constrained view of
the Court's mandate, a criticism made compelling in light of the mandatory language of
Article 63 and the enforcement machinery of many modern treaties. [FN125]
Jurisprudence relating to third parties before the ECJ is also helpful in formulating ways
of limiting intervention under the WTO. The source of jurisdiction of the ECJ derives
from the constituent statutes of the European Community, the European Atomic Energy
Agency, and the European Coal and Steel Community. These communities, known
collectively since 1994 as the "European Union," together form an integrated whole, with
the Court constituting the chief judicial organ. For this reason, appeals from national
courts on a broad range of issues are accepted. The ECJ can therefore be regarded as a
hybrid between the ICJ, where only States may appear, and a municipal court, where
traditional private parties litigate.
Broadly speaking, all three constituent statutes of the Union contain comparable
provisions for intervention in contentious proceedings. [FN126] Their general
framework, however, differs from that of the ICJ in the sense that intervention is more
readily available to certain parties in certain types of cases. The EC and Euratom statutes
permit Member States and the Community to intervene in all contentious proceedings
before the Court. Private parties may intervene in cases between Community institutions
and individuals, but must demonstrate that they have an interest in the outcome of the
case. Member countries and Community institutions do not need to demonstrate a
justification to intervene on the theory that the Community's integrative interest must be
asserted in *650 litigation and that members and institutions are best able to represent this
interest.
As with the ICJ, a principal area of contention is whether a third party can show the
requisite interest, which has been interpreted as an interest in the operative part of the

final judgment. Once accepted, third parties are allowed wide latitude to fashion their
arguments as long as they sustain the result of the case or the success of the arguments.
Elaborate jurisprudence has grown up based on extensive precedent. The main trend has
been summarized by one authority as follows:
It seems clear from the cases that, to justify intervention, the result of the case must affect
the intervener's legal position, his economic position . . . or, possibly, his freedom of
action. The effect must flow directly from the precise subject matter of the dispute, which
is to be settled in the operative part of the judgment, and not to be collateral to it; it must
be concrete, or real, and not abstract or theoretical . . . . [FN127]
The intervener is not allowed to determine the scope of the proceedings by introducing a
new claim. The ECJ's Rules of Procedure state that the intervener must accept the case as
it is. [FN128] The intervener is not, however, required to put forward positive arguments
in favor of the total acceptance or rejection of the case as argued by one of the parties. He
or she can argue selectively on certain points in the manner of amicus curiae, and
government parties and EC institutions can make hybrid submissions. There is also
authority for the principle that interveners can raise a new ground or exceptions that the
Court could consider of its own motion and third parties can make use of any argument to
support a party's position even if it conflicts with those advanced by the party in whose
support they are intervening. [FN129] Lasok notes that the current wording of statutes in
the Community suggests that the intervener can raise matters of fact and law that have
not previously been raised by the parties virtually without limit, but adds that there is
little caselaw on point. [FN130]
The extensive ECJ caselaw affords opportunities for comparison between the ICJ, ECJ,
and WTO. It is notable that in each system state parties predominate and are in a
privileged position in seeking third party status. This position no doubt reflects the
posture of international law that only States are actors. Yet, it is possible that there are
different reasons motivating the rules on intervention in each system. In the ICJ, the
Court *651 has struggled to maintain a bilateral focus because of an acute awareness that,
as consent is the basis of its jurisdiction, intervention detracts from a state party's
reasonable expectation that it will only have one adversary to oppose. Active intervention
may make countries less willing either to submit to the court's jurisdiction or to accept its
judgment. [FN131]
There is no similar concern under the European or WTO system because of the existence
of a uniform treaty providing a structure for dispute settlement. States cannot derogate
from the respective system without consequences, but no such repercussion can be
expected from withdrawal or failure to attend before the ICJ. Indeed, nonattendance
before the ICJ has been the subject of much scholarly commentary. [FN132] Strict
interpretation of the right to intervene before the ICJ is thus consistent with consensual
jurisdiction because it strikes at the heart of the Court's competence. It is also consistent
with the Court's origin as an adjudicative body founded on arbitral principles; in
traditional arbitration, third parties have no standing. [FN133] Since these attributes are a
lesser concern in the ECJ and WTO, they should presumptively be more permissive
towards intervener status before them.
The WTO and ECJ are not identical, however. Their aims differ substantially, especially
in that the EC seeks to integrate States in a manner that the WTO does not. The WTO's
main aim is to increase global prosperity through economic interdependence. A teleologic

view of this purpose suggests that in the WTO's final stage country members will
probably remain the basis of the WTO system. Consequently, as the WTO's principal
actors, countries must be the ones accorded the greatest rights in it. Their intervener
status must be recognized if such status is to be accorded to any entity at all. The ECJ can
afford greater third party participation because the range of interests it represents is
broader than that of the WTO.
B. Limits to Intervention under GATT
In sum, the aim of the WTO suggests a more liberal attitude to intervention than the ICJ,
but a less generous one than that of the ECJ. This intermediate posture is reinforced by
three considerations.
*652 The first is the effect of precedent. Intervention is based on the principle that a
decision will have an effect beyond the parties directly involved. At the outset of this
article, it was observed that a given decision can have two effects: one is immediate as a
result of the facts of that particular decision, the other is prospective as a result of the
case's effect on other cases. Leaving aside the case of immediate impact, the principle of
prospective effect must, in turn, be based on a system of strong precedent because
without precedent, present pronouncements do not bind the future. But a feature of
international law, as distinct from municipal law, is a lack of strict precedent, with each
case decided according to the justice of the circumstances, which may, but need not,
[FN134] mean recourse to previous decisions. The precedential effect of decisions is
therefore much more ambiguous. On one hand, the lack of precedential effect has been
cited as a reason for non-participant parties to not be concerned about decisions in
international law. In the GATT context, this view has been given expression by DSU
Article 3(2), which states that "[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to
or diminish the rights and obligations provided in [GATT]." [FN135] On the other hand,
it has been forcefully argued that decisions in international law do have an impact,
particularly when they contain persuasive reasoning.
The interpretation of GATT has followed a middle course between contending extremes.
The Appellate Body visited the question of precedent in Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
[FN136] acknowledging that adopted panel reports "create legitimate expectations among
WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to
any dispute." [FN137] The Appellate Body went on to observe, however, that panel
reports are "not binding, except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between
the parties to that dispute." [FN138] It added that their "character and legal status have
not been changed by the coming into force of the WTO Agreement." [FN139] Thus,
adopted panel reports are not binding, but can create "legitimate expectations." They do
not require non-participating parties to act in any way, although they may create
"legitimate expectations" that members will behave according to certain norms in future.
This *653 system of attenuated precedent may promote a liberal attitude toward
intervention among WTO members.
Secondly, the intermediate posture on intervention is reinforced by the argument that
sovereign consent is, at least in theory, a subsidiary concern under GATT. Nations
consent to be members in the GATT, as they do to the Statute of the ICJ. Thereafter,
however, they are subject to a scheme which they cannot opt out of. [FN140] Members
have no recourse in non-attendance [FN141] or reservation, as they might have if they
were contemplating defending an action in the ICJ. [FN142] Given the more binding

nature of the GATT 1994 and that it is the only regime where certain concerns can be
resolved, third party status should be more accessible than it might be otherwise.
The third and final consideration is an inference that arises from the negotiating history of
the Uruguay Round. Had the Members of GATT been attracted to the notion of
restrictive access for third parties, perhaps they would have allowed appeals of panel
decisions to the ICJ. There was every opportunity to do so, and precedent for such a
procedure in the Havana Charter. The fact that the Members did not implies that they
roundly rejected the Court's model of rigidity and inefficiency, including its ambiguous
attitude toward third party participation. But if this intermediate posture is in fact sound,
are there means of limiting intervention where it threatens to be unmanageable or is being
abused? Chinkin, writing in the context of the ICJ, identifies purpose, consent, and the
type of case as determinants of intervention. [FN143]
The DSU currently says very little about purpose. DSU Article 3(10) mandates good
behavior by members and appears to rule out intervention for improper motives, such as
delay or prevarication. As seen, however, Members have used third party status
imaginatively and panels have shown reluctance to question assertions of "substantial
interest." Nevertheless, in extreme cases improper purpose could be a ground for
restricting third party participation.
Chinkin's second determinant is consent, which plays a minor role in the DSU. Article
4(11) conditions third party participation in consultations *654 on the respondent's
consent. Article 5 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII mandates
submission of a claim of "substantial interest" to the Member proposing to withdraw the
concession; to the extent that this determination is approval-driven, consent will apply.
Otherwise, consent is irrelevant, and seems too much at odds with the generally
permissive character of intervention under GATT to determine status.
Similarly, the type of intervention may have a bearing on the nature of the intervention
permissible, but only in the loosest sense. For example, there might be valid reason to
increase the number of interveners in cases involving transnational issues, such as
services or the environment, or to limit them where specific trade-linked provisions or
developing countries are involved.
Chinkin's proscriptions are thus restrictive only in the most general sense and do not
establish bright-line criteria for limitation. Concrete proposals would be more useful. The
above review of the ICJ and ECJ models suggests the following methods of restricting
intervention:
1) panels could scrutinize assertions of "substantial interest" more carefully. In this
regard, they could probe the actual reason for intervention, although this exercise would
not be without controversy;
2) panels could also demand, as does the ECJ, that a third party interest be present and
real, as opposed to abstract or prospective;
3) a further limit could be imposed by means of a formal interpretation of the term
"substantial interest" for certain purposes under WTO Agreement Article IX:2;
4) panels could insist that interveners make arguments in support of the positions of the
party on whose side they intervene so as to reduce the scope of intervention and diminish
its attraction;
5) as mentioned, it may be possible for the DSB to encourage or mandate more group
representation and paper submissions in order to limit numbers.

Of course, one unwelcome side effect of these suggestions could be to encourage
Members to intervene as principal parties. They would still have to claim nullification or
impairment, or alternately non-violation, but the current wording and practice of both
party and third party status are very broad, meaning that any reasonable restriction will be
hard to implement. Ultimately, it may be left to the judgment of each WTO member to
exercise restraint in third party practice.
*655 Conclusion
To conclude, it is useful to return to the series of questions posed at the beginning of this
article in order to review the answers that have been given.
The series began with the central question, namely, what level of interest is necessary to
intervene under GATT? The answer is a "substantial interest," although, as seen, this
term has a highly indeterminate quality to it. Panel reports both before and after the
Uruguay Round suggest an elastic definition. Some level of minimum interest is probably
required, but the reports reveal that this interest may be actual or prospective, traderelated or abstract, and not necessarily unique to the Member asserting it. Substantive
flexibility has been joined by procedural adaptability, together corresponding to the wide
range of interests now covered by the WTO Agreement.
Third parties under GATT are presumed to intervene on behalf of the complainant.
However, this has not stopped panels from allowing Members to intervene on behalf of
respondents when there is the need. The fact that the rules on this and many other points
are wanting has contributed to the tendency for ad hoc interpretation. Whether this
flexibility will be exhibited by the Appellate Body is uncertain, but the emerging
jurisprudence suggests that divisions have taken a pragmatic approach to issues before
them.
Panels have imposed some substantive restraint on third parties. For example, interveners
are not allowed to raise new issues or to insist on procedures where there is a desire to
settle. Even in this respect, however, panels have not been overly rigid. Panels accord
third parties considerable latitude in making submissions, so much so that third parties
may have used their status, on occasion, for purposes collateral to the litigation itself.
To curb overuse or abusive behavior when necessary, it may be possible to scrutinize
assertions of "substantial interest" more carefully, to require the interest asserted be
present and real, to adopt a restricted definition of the term "substantial interest," or to
encourage or insist on group representation or paper submissions by third parties. At the
same time, there is no guarantee that these proposals will work. Efforts to rein in
intervention and to prevent abuse will be difficult as the notion of "substantive interest"
becomes more diffuse in the ever-growing ambit of the WTO. It may not be long before
these proposals will be matched by the ingenuity of legal minds to circumvent them.
Tightening up the criteria for intervention could also have the unwelcomed side effect of
forcing Members to assert interests as parties.
*656 Yet, the current vogue for active intervention could be short-lived. It is important to
remember that this is a comparatively early time in the history of the WTO. There is at
least the reasonable possibility that some of the more innovative and aggressive positions
which are being taken under the guise of intervention are being adopted to determine, in a
sense, "how much can be gotten away with." Once the ground rules are set, third party
status may be used relatively less than it is today.
In addition, it may be wise not to make much of the current "problem" of intervention, if

this is indeed an accurate description. As this article demonstrates, active intervention has
long been a feature of GATT. For interests content with the existing state-centered
system, a reason to keep third party practice as it is currently is that, to the extent national
participation is easily achieved and open-ended, the system may diffuse pressure for
greater public participation in the WTO.
There are also reasons to suggest that multipartite intervention may not become a
problem in future either. One reason is the inability of Members to show "substantial
interest," regardless of how illusory a standard that might be. Alternately, Members may
not want to intervene, or as it appears from the Bananas Trilogy, may be content to allow
other Members to appear on their behalf. A further pragmatic reason may be that not all
Members have the resources to intervene. Even the redoubtable Office of the United
States' Trade Representative has recently stated that it is unable to pursue every traderelated matter in which the U.S. has an interest due to lack of resources. [FN144]
Thus, the argument that the WTO resolution system will collapse as a result of vigorous
third party participation must be repudiated. The Bananas Trilogy is not the first, nor in
all likelihood will it be the last time that multiple intervention will occur. There is every
indication that WTO dispute resolution is becoming truly multilateralized, thereby
fulfilling its original conception. This development should ensure that future possibilities
for third party participation remain of substantial interest.
*657 Postscript
The panel released its report in Bananas III on May 22, 1997. [FN145] The report
contained a section specifically devoted to the organizational issue of third party
participation in the case, evidence that the issue was important to the panel.
In brief, the panel referred both to the mandatory language of DSU Article 10 ("shall
have the opportunity to be heard . . ."), paragraph 6 of Appendix 3 (shall be invited "to
present their views . . .[and] may be present during the entirety of the session") and the
fact that under GATT practice, more expansive rights were granted to third parties in
several disputes, as support for greater third party rights in Bananas III. [FN146]
However, it also noted that under previous cases the extension of third party rights had
been agreed to between the parties. There was no similar agreement in Bananas III.
In reviewing its interim decision to allow fuller third party participation, the panel
observed that its initial ruling had been based on considerations of i) the economic effect
of the disputed banana regime on third parties, ii) the fact that the economic benefits
derived from Lomé IV, an international treaty, iii) past practice, and iv) the failure of the
parties to agree on the question. [FN147] It is interesting that the panel apparently
deviated from international law and practice by interpreting the lack of consensus in
favor of greater participation, rather than against, as a strict interpretation of the will of
the parties would imply. This is in sharp distinction to practice in the ICJ, where, as seen,
the power of the parties to impose limits on the Court's adjudication is great.
Nevertheless, the panel reminded its audience that third party rights are not completely
unrestrained by denying the request of several third parties to participate in the interim
review process, except to allow them to review a draft of their arguments. In so doing the
panel relied on the language of DSU Article 15, which deals with interim review and
"refers only to parties as participants in that process." [FN148]
[FNa1]. S.J.D. Candidate, Georgetown University Law Center; LL.M., University of
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Intervention therefore enjoys a legitimacy and immediacy which NGO involvement does
not, although the debate about NGO involvement may influence how third interests,
including those now asserted by WTO member countries, will be treated in future GATT
dispute resolution. For literature on the subject of NGO involvement see Steve
Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade
Organization, 17 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 331 (1996); Phillip M. Nichols, Extension of
Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to Nongovernmental Parties, 17 U. Pa. J.
Int'l Econ. L. 295 (1996); Daniel Esty, Why the World Trade Organization Needs
Environmental NGOs (Nov. 9, 1996) (unpublished paper on file with the author).
[FN11]. Debra Steger, General Counsel to the WTO Appellate Body, estimated that the
GATT workload averaged about three formal complaints per year during the 1970s and
eleven complaints per year during the 1980s. See WTO: Sharp Increase Seen in WTO
Disputes Including Many from Developing Countries, BNA Int'l Trade Daily (Oct. 18,
1996).
[FN12]. Id.
[FN13]. The United States has assumed standing, among other arguments, on the basis
that a U.S.-owned multinational company, Chiquita Brands International, is restricted in
marketing bananas, a service covered by the General Agreement on Services (GATS).
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[FN33]. Id.
[FN34]. Jackson, World Trade, supra note 9, at 176.
[FN35]. Id. at 175.
[FN36]. "Substantial interest" appears in the GATT as follows: "all other contracting
parties having a substantial interest in supplying the product concerned," "a substantial
interest in supplying the product shares," "any other contracting party having a
substantial interest in supplying that product" (Art. XIII); "substantial interest as
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that it would provide "adequate opportunities for [countries enjoying certain preferential
trading arrangements with the EC] to participate in the work of the panel as necessary
and appropriate." At least a dozen countries were allowed to intervene and several made
submissions in favor of the respondent. It is interesting to observe that this type of mass
involvement predated the GATT Bananas Trilogy by almost a decade.
[FN60]. Customs User Fee, supra note 47.

[FN61]. Id. at 290.
[FN62]. See also Non-Rubber Footwear, supra note 46; Trade in Semi-conductors, supra
note 46; Restrictions on Imports of Sugar, supra note 46 (submission of the EC);
European Economic Community--Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, May
16, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 132 (1990) (submission of the United States)
[hereinafter Parts and Components].
[FN63]. See U.S.--Restrictions on Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, Mar. 13, 1984,
GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 67 (1985) (United States did not invoke Art. XXI);
European Economic Community--Quantitative Restrictions Against Imports of Certain
Products from Hong Kong, July 12, 1983, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 129 (1984) (EC
did not invoke Grandfather Clause), as identified in McGovern, supra note 9, at 36.
[FN64]. See Parts and Components, supra note 62. The United States, as a third party,
had argued that GATT Article VI provided a basis for measures to prevent circumvention
of anti-dumping duties. During the proceedings the EC stated that, if the panel were to
find that the anti-circumvention duties were justifiable under Article VI, "it would not
disagree" with such an approach.
[FN65]. GATT Unadopted Unpublished Panel Report on U.S.--Trade Measures Affecting
Nicaragua, 1986 WL 363154, L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986).
[FN66]. Japan--Measures on Imports of Leather, Nov. 6, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th
Supp.) at 320 (1980), as cited by McGovern, supra note 9, at 36.
[FN67]. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, supra note 47.
[FN68]. An informal third party interest under GATT is that of developing countries.
Various provisions require consideration of developing country interests in
decisionmaking. Recently, this consideration has been explicitly endorsed with respect to
least developed countries. See Dispute Settlement Understanding Art. 24(1).
Nevertheless, it remains unclear how these interests are to be asserted in the abstract in
disputes between developed countries. For a discussion of WTO dispute settlement and
developing countries see Alice Alexandra Kipel, Special and Differential Treatment for
Developing Countries, in The World Trade Organization: The Multinational Trade
Framework for the 21st Century and U.S. Implementing Legislation 617 (Terrence P.
Stewart ed., 1996).
[FN69]. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 2, Legal Instruments--Results of the Uruguay
Round vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
[FN70]. The "Dunkel Draft" from the GATT Secretariat, Dec. 20, 1991, The Uruguay
Round Negotiations Committee (1992) at S.9. Among the changes between the Dunkel

Draft and the Understanding was the title ("third contracting parties" versus "third
parties") and minor clarification of the text. An earlier version of the draft, circulated as a
"decision" arising from the Montreal/Geneva Mid-Term Review of 1988-89, conditioned
disclosure of written submissions to third parties on the parties' permission. It also did not
mention third party access to normal GATT dispute settlement procedures, as was later
provided in Article 10(4). See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Decisions
Adopted at the Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round, 28 I.L.M. 1025, 1033 (1989).
[FN71]. It is of interest that the terminology of "substantial interest" has also been used
with respect to the qualification of intervention in certain provisions of the North
American Free Trade Agreement. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,
1992, arts. 2006(3), 2008(3), H.R. Rep. No. 103-159, vol. 1, at 712 (1993). See also
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, arts. 22(3),
24(2), 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993); North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept.
14, 1993, arts. 22(2), 27(3), 29(2), 32 I.L.M. 1502 (1993).
[FN72]. DSU, supra note 69, at 1227.
[FN73]. Id. (emphasis added).
[FN74]. Id.
[FN75]. Id. at 1232 (emphasis added).
[FN76]. "Substantial interest" occurs in the GATT 1994 and associated agreements twice
in the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 1 WTO Treaties Binder 23, once in the Marrakesh Protocol to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. 4, 1 WTO Treaties Binder 25, once
in the Agreement on Agriculture art. 12, 1 WTO Treaties Binder 27, twice in the
Agreement on Safeguards art. 5(2), 1 WTO Treaties Binder 327 and four times in the
DSU, supra note 69.
[FN77]. The Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 1 WTO Treaties Binder 23 shows considerable
effort by the negotiators to circumscribe use of "substantial interest." Article 5 requires a
member which considers it has a substantial interest to communicate its claim in writing
with supporting evidence to a member proposing to withdraw or modify a tariff
concession.
[FN78]. DSU, supra note 69, at 1227.
[FN79]. In Turkey--Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products WT/DS29,
WTO Dispute Settlement "State-of-Play" (last modified Sept. 29, 1997) <http://www.org/
wto/dispute/bulletin.htm> [hereinafter Textile and Clothing Products], Hong Kong has
complained that Turkish quantitative restrictions on imports of textiles and clothing
violate GATT Articles XI and XIII. Turkey has replied that the measures were taken in

order to adapt Turkish commercial policy to the process of integration in a customs union
with the EC. Following Hong Kong's request for consultations, Turkey asked that Hong
Kong accept the EC's participation in consultations on equal terms with Turkey as "a
joint exercise." Hong Kong has refused, although the wording of DSU Article 4(11)
suggests that the choice is that of the member "to which the request for consultations was
addressed," which is presumably Turkey. See Gustavo Nogueira, The First Appellate
Body Review: United States--Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 30
J. World Trade 5, 7 n. 5 (1996).
[FN80]. DSU, supra note 69, at 1232 (emphasis added).
[FN81]. Id. at 1245.
[FN82]. See Chinkin, supra note 18, at 183 (citing Malta, 1981 I.C.J. 3, 35).
[FN83]. In GATT Unpublished Panel Report on European Economic Community-Member States' Import Regimes for Bananas, 1993 GATTPD LEXIS 11, DS32/R (June
3, 1993) [hereinafter Bananas I], the panel received a letter from the representative of
Belize formally requesting that the panel suspend its proceedings two days before
hearings began. Belize requested that the parties begin consultations immediately and that
it be admitted as a full participant in the panel proceedings. The panel denied the request
to suspend consultations because the 60-day consultation period had expired, and also
denied the Belizean request to participate because the parties could not agree to it
between themselves.
[FN84]. World Trade Organization Appellate Body, Working Procedures for Appellate
Review, 35 I.L.M. 495 (1996) [hereinafter Appellate Working Procedures].
[FN85]. Article 17(4) reads, "Only parties to the dispute, not third parties, may appeal a
panel report. Third parties which have notified the DSB of a substantial interest in the
matter pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 10 may make written submissions to, and be
given an opportunity to be heard by, the Appellate Body." Intriguing is the fact that a
third party apparently has no affirmative duty to make submissions before the panel in
order to preserve its right to make them before the Appellate Body. Id.
[FN86]. Appellate Working Procedures, supra note 84, art. 27(3).
[FN87]. The text of Appellate Working Procedures Article 27(3) states that any third
participant which has filed a submission "may appear," implying that written submissions
are sufficient.
[FN88]. Appellate Working Procedures, supra note 84, art. 28(1).
[FN89]. Id. art. 22(1).
[FN90]. Trade in Semi-conductors, supra note 46.

[FN91]. Appellate Working Procedures, supra note 77, art. 16(1).
[FN92]. Article 2 of the DSU Working Procedures requires that panels meet in closed
sessions, while Article 6 formally permits third party attendance only at "a session" of a
panel meeting, not at the entire meeting itself. The Appellate Working Procedures are
more ambiguous on third participant attendance and the secrecy of division hearings.
Article 24 refers to third parties participating as third participants "in the appeal" and
Article 27(3) indicates that third participants "may appear to make oral arguments or
presentations at the oral hearing" without further qualification. While there is no blanket
secrecy provision in the Appellate Working Procedures comparable to that which exists
in Art. 2 of the DSU Working Procedures, there are various qualifications of
confidentiality in the Appellate Body Rules of Conduct. See Appellate Working
Procedures, supra note 84, Annex II: Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. VI [hereinafter Appellate Body
Rules of Conduct]
[FN93]. DSU, supra note 69, art. 22(2). See also id. art. 3(7) .
[FN94]. Active third party intervention can hamper the DSB's ability to find panelists.
Debra Steger, Counsel to the Appellate Body, has referred to this problem, saying that
"[i]n the WTO's first year of operation, most of the panelists have come from either
Switzerland or New Zealand, with Norway also a popular choice because of its position
as one of the few remaining European countries that is not an EU member." See WTO:
Sharp Increase seen in WTO Disputes Including Many from Developing Countries, BNA
Int'l Trade Daily, at D-4 (Oct. 18, 1996). The Appellate Body itself is not affected by this
problem because division members participate "regardless of national origin". See
Appellate Working Procedures art. 6(2). Nevertheless, division members do have
obligations of independence, impartiality and confidentiality. See Appellate Body Rules
of Conduct, supra note 92, art. 7(1).
[FN95]. Appellate Body Rules of Conduct, supra note 87, art. 7(1).
[FN96]. "[T]he WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary
practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947." WTO Agreement
art. XVI(1).
[FN97]. See WTO Appellate Body: Report of the Appellate Body in United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603, 615-16 (May 20,
1996).
[FN98]. The matter, GATT Unpublished Panel Report on European Community-- Trade
Description of Scallops, 1996 GATTPD LEXIS 1, WT/DS7, WT/DS12, WT/DS14,
(Aug. 5, 1996) [hereinafter Trade Description of Scallops], involved a consolidated
dispute brought by Canada, Chile and Peru against a French Government order on the
labelling of scallops. The case was settled while the hearing was in progress in July,

1996. See WTO Panel To Probe Japan's Domestic Liquor Taxation Scheme, 12 Int'l
Trade Rep. 1650 (1995).
[FN99]. Germans have a high per capita consumption of bananas and consider the fruit a
"cultural icon". See Jack J. Chen, Going Bananas: How the WTO Can Heal the Split in
the Global Banana Trade Dispute, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1283, 1294 (1995).
[FN100]. The requesting countries were Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua
and Venezuela.
[FN101]. The decision, Bananas I, supra note 83, indicates that the Contracting Parties
agreed as follows:
(i) that the representatives of Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Jamaica, Madagascar and Senegal
would be invited to all panel meetings at which the parties were present;
(ii) that [these] parties would have to make a submission if they were to attend Panel
meetings and that submissions made by such contracting parties should be made in
writing, or if made orally, would also be made available in writing;
(iii) that [these] representatives ... would receive all submissions of the parties; and,
(iv) that these same contracting parties would be invited by the Panel to speak as
appropriate.
The panel cautioned, however, that "this procedure should not be considered a precedent
for future panels in light of the very special circumstances of the case." Id.
[FN102]. Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar and Senegal appear to have made
submissions on behalf of the "African ACP Contracting Parties." Jamaica appears to have
made similar submissions on its own behalf and those of "its Caribbean counterparts," but
confined much of its argument to the continuing validity of colonial preferences it had
received from Britain upon independence. Id.
[FN103]. In 1993, fifty-five of the seventy ACP countries belonging to the Lomé
Convention were members of GATT.
[FN104]. See Kees Jan Kuilwijk, The European Court and the GATT Dilemma: Public
Interest versus Individual Rights? 187-88 (1996). Though restrictive, Regulation 404/93
was part of an adoption of a policy of free trade in the Community, one benefit of which
was supposed to be more efficient mechanisms for providing foreign aid.
[FN105]. Dispute Settlement Panel Report on the European Economic Community-Import Regime for Bananas, Jan. 18, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 177, 181 (1995) (not adopted)
[hereinafter BananasII].
[FN106]. The third parties invited by the panel to participate were Belize, Brazil,
Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Madagascar, the
Philippines, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname. However, the panel
report discloses that other countries, such as Tanzania, were also represented.

[FN107]. Bananas II, supra note 105, at 182.
[FN108]. Id. at 212.
[FN109]. The panel noted the indirect effect of a change in EC regulations of bananas on
Brazil, despite the fact that Brazil was not a substantial supplier to the EC at that time.
The panel mentioned trade diversion felt by Brazilian banana exporters, the decrease in
Brazil's trade balance and domestic instability, as well as the impact on associated
domestic industries such as packaging and transportation. Id. at 210.
[FN110]. Tanzania, for example, noted that its production of bananas was currently
consumed domestically but that there existed a potential to develop production for
exports. On this basis Tanzania mentioned its concern that the panel's deliberations could
have a negative effect for those ACP countries that benefited from a preferential trading
regime with the EC as a result of Lomé IV. Id. at 214.
[FN111]. Id. at 229.
[FN112]. Id.
[FN113]. The text of the waiver, sought and received by the EC in December 1994, states
that:
"the terms and conditions set out hereunder ... shall be waived, until 29 February 2000, to
the extent necessary to permit the European Communities to provide preferential
treatment for products originating in ACP States as required by the relevant provisions of
the Fourth Lomé Convention, without being required to extend the same preferential
treatment to like products of any other contracting party."
The Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, Dec. 19, 1994, GATT Doc. L/7604 at 2
(Dec. 19, 1994).
[FN114]. The EC concluded the Framework Agreement in March 1994 with four of the
five original Bananas II litigants (Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Venezuela). Only
Guatemala refused to join. The Agreement was an attempt to appease the litigants with a
guaranteed share of the EC market and an in-quota rate of 75 ecu per tonne. In return, the
litigants agreed not to press for adoption of the Bananas II panel report. The Agreement
provides that of the global tariff quota of 2 million tonnes, Colombia was to be allotted
21%, Costa Rica 23.4%, Nicaragua 3% and Venezuela 2%. Both Colombia and Costa
Rica later defected from this arrangement under U.S. pressure, but not before the
Community succeeded in having these respective shares incorporated into its Uruguay
Round schedule by virtue of Article 10 of the Agreement, thereby giving them
permanence.
[FN115]. See U.S. to Press Costa Rica, Colombia to Kill Banana Framework, Inside U.S.
Trade, Jan. 5, 1996, at 3; U.S. Presses Ecuador to Join WTO Challenge of EU Banana
Rules, Inside U.S. Trade, Jan. 26, 1996, at 24.

[FN116]. See supra note 58.
[FN117]. Trade in Semi-conductors, supra note 46.
[FN118]. See GATT Unpublished Panel Report on Japan--Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, 1996 GTTWPD LEXIS 2 WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R, (July 11,
1996) [[[hereinafter Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages]; Trade Description of Scallops, supra
note 98; Textile and Clothing Products, supra note 79; Indonesia-- Certain Measures
Affecting the Automobile Industry, 1997 WL 442326, (Aug. 5, 1997) (complaints by the
European Communities (WT/DS54), Japan (2) (WT/DS55, 64) and the United States
(WT/DS59)).
[FN119]. Shabtai Rosenne, Intervention in the International Court of Justice 14 (1993).
[FN120]. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1031, 3 Bevans 1153
(1946).
[FN121]. Before the Permanent Court of International Justice, forerunner of the current
Court, there was a successful attempt to intervene in S.S. Wimbledon (U.K., France, Italy
and Japan v. Germany), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1 (Poland intervening). Before the ICJ,
there has been one successful intervention under Article 63 in Haya de la Torre
(Colombia v. Peru), 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 71 (Cuba intervening). Other requests to intervene
made under Article 62 were denied, including Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), 1973
I.C.J. Rep. 320 (Fiji requesting intervention); Case Concerning the Continental Shelf
(Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1981 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Malta requesting intervention);
Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 1984 I.C.J. Rep.
3 (Italy requesting intervention) and Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute
(Honduras/El Salvador), 1990 I.C.J. Rep. 92 (Nicaragua requesting intervention). A
request to intervene was made, and denied, under Article 63 in Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 215 (El
Salvador requesting intervention).
[FN122]. Christine Chinkin, Third-Party Intervention before the International Court of
Justice, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 495, 531 (1986) [[[hereinafter Third-Party Intervention]. See
also Tania Licari, Intervention under Article 62 of the Statute of the ICJ, 8 Brooklyn J.
Int'l L. 267 (1982); Natalie S. Klein, Multilateral Disputes and the Doctrine of Necessary
Parties in the East Timor Case, 21 Yale J. Int'l L. 305 (1996).
[FN123]. In Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
U.S.), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 392, 431, El Salvador claimed it
wanted to intervene under the Statute of the Court and several inter-American
conventions. The ICJ characterized the contents of El Salvador's declaration as relating
more properly to the merits phase of the case. The Court therefore rejected the
declaration.
[FN124]. See Third-Party Intervention, supra note 122, at 514.

[FN125]. For example, treaties under the U.N. system can be enforced by the Security
Council under U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2. By definition all written treaties concluded
after 1980 are subject to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969), which also contains enforcement machinery.
[FN126]. K.P.E. Lasok, The European Court of Justice: Practice and Procedure 153 (2d
ed. 1994).
[FN127]. Id. at 167-68.
[FN128]. Id. at 168.
[FN129]. Id. at 170.
[FN130]. Id. at 171.
[FN131]. Third Party Intervention, supra note 122, at 530.
[FN132]. See Keith Highet, Nonappearance and Disappearance before the International
Court of Justice, 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 237 (1987) (reviewing Jerome B. Elkind, NonAppearance before the International Court of Justice: Functional and Comparative
Analysis (1984) and H.W.A. Thirlway, Nonappearance before the International Court of
Justice (1985)).
[FN133]. Chinkin notes that "the concept of party autonomy is strongest where the
parties provide for an ad hoc arbitration." See Chinkin, supra note 18, at 249.
[FN134]. Id. at 20, 54.
[FN135]. DSU, supra note 65, at 1227.
[FN136]. WTO Report of the Appellate Body in Japan--Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
Wl I.E.L.-I-B-81, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/R (Sept. 25, 1996).
[FN137]. Id. at 24.
[FN138]. Id.
[FN139]. Id. The Appellate Body also observed that unadopted reports have "no legal
status in the GATT or WTO system" but agreed that "a panel could nevertheless find
useful guidance in the reasoning" of such a report. Id. at 25 (citing Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, supra note 118, at 126.
[FN140]. It is possible for Members to obtain waivers under GATT Art. XXV, but under
GATT 1994 these are now more difficult to obtain.

[FN141]. Notwithstanding the above, the United States has recently threatened not to
appear before a panel established to examine U.S. anti-Cuba legislation. See David E.
Sanger, U.S. Won't Offer Trade Testimony on Cuba Embargo, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21,
1997, at A1.
[FN142]. One of the key advantages of the WTO Agreement over previous arrangements
is its uniformity. Members are no longer able to apply "GATT a la carte," except with
respect to certain side agreements. Members are also bound by numerous assurances of
good faith, as well as the more general obligation of pacta sunt servanda in Article 26 of
the Vienna Convention.
[FN143]. See Third-Party Intervention, supra note 122, at 522-24.
[FN144]. "Terry Stewart, managing partner at the law firm Stewart and Stewart ... argued
that the limited resources of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative make large-scale
use of WTO dispute settlement problematic .... Senior USTR officials have informally
said in recent months that personnel shortages have made it impossible to pursue the
WTO cases they want to pursue." See Official Sees WTO Case Load Leading to
Bilateral, Regional Solutions, Inside U.S. Trade, Jan. 10, 1997, at 8.
[FN145]. This postscript refers to Bananas III, supra note 3, Complaint by United States.
Three other decisions, dealing with the complaints by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
and Mexico, were released simultaneously. However, the most extensive discussion of
third party participation is contained in the complaint by the United States.
[FN146]. See id. para.7.5.
[FN147]. See id. para.7.8.
[FN148]. See id. para.7.9.

